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The current Covid-19 pandemic, which has – at the time of 
writing – claimed more than 100.000 lives worldwide and 
counts more than 1.8 million detected cases (with estimates 
about the real number of cases ranging from 10% of the pop-
ulation of the most affected countries to 50%), constitutes a 
very significant challenge to the international order. In the 
EU, the political and socioeconomic consequences linked to 
the drastic measures taken by member states to respond to 
the sanitary emergency will produce long-lasting effects on 
citizens’ trust in their country, and on the extent to which 
they identify with the European integration project. In this 
context, the EU needs to demonstrate its added value in the 
face of the increasing centrifugal, ‘member states first’ ap-
proaches put forward by European capitals. At the same 
time, the gravity of the situation may also act as a catalyst 
for accelerated integration, in particular stronger coordina-
tion and more rapid and decisive decision-making at the Eu-
ropean and Eurozone levels. Furthermore, the Covid-19 cri-
sis may provide unexpected opportunities on the global 
stage for the recently appointed Commission’s geopolitical 
ambitions. 
The impact of Covid-19 on EU geopolitics 
In spite of their great diversity, geopolitical actors such as the 
US, Russia and China all possess a distinctive control over 
space, resources and communities within their borders (Kis-
singer 2001). First, they exhibit a relatively high level of inter-
nal cohesion and political unity, shaping their identity and en-
abling centralised or rapid decision-making. Second, they ef-
fectively control the strategic allocation of resources and ca-
pabilities towards the achievement of precise goals. Third, 
they possess the ability to act on the international arena so 
as to create partnerships based on shared values and com-
mon interests. Ursula von der Leyen was indeed fully aware 
that the EU is not such a traditional geopolitical actor when 
she outlined the political priorities defining her Commission’s 
geopolitical approach in December 2019. Her focus on 
strengthening internal cohesion, building strategic autonomy 
and uploading multilateral governance through new strategic 
alliances was thus aimed to help the Union diminish the gap 
with the other great powers on the global arena.  
Neither rapid nor centralised, the EU’s decision-making 
power is spread across member states quarrelling in the  (Eu-
ropean) Council and the Commission. The Union does not 
possess resources and capabilities comparable to those of rel-
evant geopolitical players, as its budget amounts to only 
about 1% of EU GDP and its action is constrained by member 
states’ control over strategic areas of policy-making such as 
industry, health and disaster prevention. Finally, although the 
EU does have an international presence, it cannot operate 
easily on the global arena as foreign policy decisions are 
amongst others constrained by the unanimity vote rule.  
Under such circumstances, the Covid-19 pandemic repre-
sents an existential challenge for the EU, as it threatens its 
identity and undermines its internal cohesion; it exposes bla-
tant differences in resources and capabilities among member 
Executive Summary 
> The Covid-19 pandemic constitutes an unprece-
dented challenge for the European Union (EU), pos-
ing existential internal as well as external threats to 
the European integration project. 
> At the same time, the impact of this global crisis on 
the international order opens unexpected windows 
of opportunity for reinforced European integration 
and a stronger EU presence in the world. 
> To seize the momentum, the European Commission 
needs to act consistently with the geopolitical ap-
proach put forward by President Ursula von der 
Leyen.  
> Internally, it must promote cohesion and unity 
among member states and coordinate a joint Euro-
pean response to the sanitary, political, and socio-
economic challenges. 
> Externally, it must join efforts with like-minded 
members of the international community to estab-
lish a robust system of multilateral crisis manage-
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states; it also reshapes the power distribution in the interna-
tional arena, as commitment to cooperation among long-
standing ‘partners’ seems to be crumbling.  
However, this policy brief argues that it is exactly because the 
EU is not a fully-fledged geopolitical actor that the Covid-19 
crisis provides a unique opportunity to shape its geopolitical 
profile. The Commission's approach to this crisis must be ho-
listic and focus on increasing the EU political system’s coordi-
nation and the policy coherence between internal and exter-
nal policies to tackle the multi-dimensional challenges posed 
by the pandemic.  
The EU’s political system: solidarity means coordination 
At member states’ level, the early impact of the Covid-19 out-
break has caused a remarkable return of assertive discourses 
on the urgency to protect the ‘national interest’. This pro-
duced an uncoordinated reaction that has not only hurt the 
Commission’s authority and perceived legitimacy but also re-
duced the effectiveness of member states’ sovereign policies, 
for instance with regard to the purchase of medical equip-
ment on the global market. The Commission’s lack of prepar-
edness and inability to contain member states’ unilateral re-
actions to the spread of the virus, including bans on intra-EU 
exports of face masks and arbitrary suspensions of the 
Schengen agreement, prompted angry remarks on the com-
plete absence of ‘European solidarity’ by leaders in the Mem-
ber States most affected by the pandemic (Reuters 2020).  
The EU recognises solidarity as a fundamental principle. It is 
inscribed in Art. 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), 
occupies an entire chapter of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and is given practical application through the clause 
enshrined in Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). However, in the absence of a clear 
definition of what constitutes solidarity, much of the respon-
sibility for shaping the principle lies with the member states. 
As such, it is fundamental for the Commission to help opera-
tionalise this principle through its effective coordination of 
member states’ action.  
A task force of five Commissioners has been established to 
tackle interconnected issues such as crisis management, 
health, border management, mobility and economy (Euro-
pean Commission 2020b). On the basis of the work of this 
task force, the Commission has already achieved a number of 
important results: it managed to obtain the lifting of the ex-
port ban on medical supplies from France and Germany (by 
threating with infringement procedures); it prescribed the 
closing of EU external borders while also proposing green 
lanes to guarantee the circulation of essential goods; it pro-
moted a fine-tuning of the EU public discourse on the re-
sponse to Covid-19, as showed by the radical change in Euro-
pean Central Bank President Lagarde’s rhetoric (Arnold 
2020); and it put forward joint voluntary tender procure-
ments to purchase sanitary equipment from outside the EU 
(European Commission 2020c).  
While progress has indeed been made towards a more effi-
cient distribution of the efforts at EU level, there is still work 
to be done to provide a comprehensive response to the pan-
demic. As the economic and political shocks pose an immi-
nent threat to the survival of the European integration pro-
ject, a truly geopolitical approach by the Commission should 
first and foremost focus on enhancing the cohesion of the EU 
political system and facilitating an agreement among mem-
ber states on the policy tools most suitable to face the crisis.  
Policy recommendation 1: The Commission should step up its 
efforts to broker an agreement on the Multilateral Financial 
Framework (MFF) among member states. Discussions over 
the new MFF were already stalling before the pandemic due 
to the hole Brexit left in the EU purse. Covid-19 has now made 
certain elements of the Commission’s proposal obsolete. As 
the EU risks to not dispose of an agreed budget for 2021, the 
Commission’ President – in cooperation with European Coun-
cil President Charles Michel – needs to, first, help promote a 
consensus at the European Council level to provide tempo-
rary financial resources until a new MFF is agreed upon and, 
second, put forward a new budget proposal encompassing 
the measures needed to address the new emergency. The 
task is admittedly hard, as member states will need to be con-
vinced to increase their contributions. However, the Commis-
sion can take account of the experience of the Covid-19 crisis 
and channel needed investments into priority areas such as 
clean energy, climate adaption and AI technologies. This 
would represent a considerable leap in the achievement of 
President von der Leyen’s sectorial priorities, and would also 
reinforce the Commission’s geopolitical profile. In the face of 
adversity, and while major powers might make other choices, 
the EU would invest smartly to promote its strategic priori-
ties. 
Policy recommendation 2: The Commission needs to succeed 
in brokering  a satisfactory deal on the financial instrument 
most suitable to fund economic recovery efforts, for all  Eu-
rozone members. Although a general agreement on the size 
of the instrument seems to be emerging at the Eurogroup 
level, the very vague wording of such “recovery fund” reveals 
that member states are still cultivating strategic ambiguity in 
their understandings of the nature of the instrument (Smith-
Meyer 2020) .  
The experience of post-financial crisis management shows 
that the EU cannot afford member states’ half-hearted com-
mitment to major policy plans, as this hinders the long-term 
integration process. Therefore, the Commission needs to 
make sure that a final compromise reflecting a clear, truly 
common vision of the EU response is reached at the level of 
heads of state. To this extent, Brussels needs to  mediate be-
tween the countries with the most power of attraction in 
each camp: France, for the states advocating for the creation 
of eurobonds (or ‘coronabonds’), and Germany, for the states 
pushing for the use of credit lines under the existing intergov-
ernmental European Stability Mechanism. Brussels’ best 
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European solidarity as member states’ enlightened self-inter-
est, as all EU countries have a clear stake in avoiding a new 
‘sovereign debt crisis’ which would expose highly indebted 
countries to foreign powers’ takeover of European strategic 
assets. The challenge is significant, but should a compromise 
be found, the Commission would have contributed to boost-
ing the resilience of the EU’s political system, paved the way 
for a Fiscal Union and laid the foundation for a considerably 
stronger political EU on the internal and external stages. 
The policy level: ‘whatever it takes’ is not ‘whatever we can’ 
President von der Leyen has pledged an unlimited support to 
member states hit by the pandemic that reminisces former 
ECB President Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ approach to 
save the Eurozone during the 2008-09 financial crisis (Zalan 
2020). The current crisis is set to produce a harsh impact on 
EU economy both on the demand and supply sides, as facto-
ries remain closed, strategic supply chains are disrupted, 
workers lose jobs and purchasing power, and consumers can-
not spend their money. In the economic realm, the Commis-
sion has initiated, with the ECB and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), a mix of fiscal flexibility and quantitative-easing 
measures. These include the temporary relaxation of its flag-
ship competition rules on state aid and the triggering of the 
‘escape clause’ allowing members to contravene Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) limitations on deficit; a €750 billion ECB 
investment in bond purchases to calm down sovereign debt 
markets; a €40 billion support to small- and medium-sized en-
terprises by the EIB; a €100 billion temporary insurance 
scheme to protect jobs at risk; and the commitment to create 
an “innovative financial instrument” to grant favourable 
credit lines for member states in need (European Council 
2020). 
In the public health sector, the Commission has pledged up 
to €37 billion to support national health care systems and 
other vulnerable parts of economies through the “Corona Re-
sponse Investment Initiative”. It has also activated, through 
its Civil Protection Mechanism, the rescEU mechanism aimed 
at stocking and rapidly deploying medical supplies to MSs in 
need. Finally, in order to urgently support Research and Inno-
vation, the Commission has pledged to mobilise €140 million 
of public and private funding for promising research projects 
on vaccines, diagnosis and treatment of Covid-19, including 
€80 million aimed at financing the work of the German phar-
maceutical firm CureVac, which has been subject to a pur-
chase bid by the US administration in the early days of Covid-
19’s arrival to Europe (European Commission 2020a). 
In spite of the Commission’s proactive engagement, however, 
limited competences in areas particularly relevant to the cur-
rent crisis substantially constrain the scope of Brussels’ inter-
vention. EU supporting competence in tax and fiscal policies 
does not allow for much more than the suspension of the 
SGP. Furthermore, the problem of the dubious sustainability 
of large sovereign debts remains and cannot be addressed by 
escape clauses or loans at favourable interests only. Regard-
ing health policy, if EU shared competence in areas of shared 
safety concerns (Arts. 4(2) and 168 TFEU) allows for the de-
ployment of instruments such as rescEU, overall supporting 
competence does not allow defining health policies or organ-
ising the provision of medical care. While the policy toolkit 
available to the Commission to tackle the crisis is limited, 
Brussels should start immediately building resilience 
measures needed to sustain EU recovery and better prepare 
for the next shocks to come. To do so, it is necessary to place 
the need to invest in and protect the  production and stock-
pile of critical assets at the centre of the political debate.  
In geopolitical terms, enhancing EU capabilities resonates 
with the Commission’s ambition to decrease Europe’s struc-
tural dependence on external actors for the provision of 
goods and fundamental services. China’s control over the 
production of facemasks and the political leverage it exerts 
through its exports are clear examples of the weaknesses the 
new EU Industrial Strategy seeks to address (European Com-
mission 2020c). Current shortages of essential medical equip-
ment across the EU highlight the relevance of the Commis-
sion’s approach to strategic autonomy in order to minimise 
similar risks in the future. 
Policy recommendation 3: The EU should include in its list of 
critical assets – currently featuring critical materials and tech-
nologies, food, infrastructure and security – those chemical 
and industrial components needed to produce essential med-
ical equipment. A targeted intervention aimed at shortening 
strategic supply chains currently disrupted by the lockdowns 
of factories around the world should be coupled with a 
broader reflection on the risks associated with structural in-
terconnectedness of the EU’s production system with actors 
who may make geoeconomic use of chain clustering across 
critical supply and value chains. Rather than pursuing an im-
possible autarky or complete decoupling from other major 
powers, strategic autonomy should allow the EU to diversify 
its dependencies and balance foreign influence on its mem-
ber states. 
Policy recommendation 4: in the medium term, strategic in-
dustrial autonomy can only become a serious objective if the 
Commission manages to lock in member states’ commitment 
to complete the Single Market, notably through the Capital 
and Banking Union and an increased role of the euro as inter-
national currency. With this, the EU would be well-equipped 
to resist the ‘weaponisation’ of trade and the financial sector 
by global powers. In the context of the post-Covid-19 recon-
struction efforts, it is particularly important that the Commis-
sion works towards the reinforcement of the Foreign Invest-
ment Screening regulation to avoid the acquisition of mem-
ber states’ strategic assets by third countries, as observable 
during the post-financial crisis period with Chinese invest-
ments in Southern Europe (Hackenbroich 2020). The comple-
tion of the Single Market would provide the Commission with 
a strategic asset in its geopolitical action. It would make the 
EU more resilient vis-à-vis foreign economic pressure. It 
would also represent a step forward for the resolution of 
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US secondary sanctions in the framework of the Iran deal and 
the North Stream 2 pipeline; the EU-US tariff war; and the 
Huawei debate with China. Additionally and more generally, 
it would provide a competitive edge for EU foreign policy. A 
stronger euro and a more solid financial sector would in fact 
help increase the number of transactions and the overall 
prosperity of the Eurozone economy. 
The international level: constructive engagement vs. isola-
tionism & authoritarian governance 
The international dimension of the Covid-19 pandemic repre-
sents a grim paradox. On the one hand, effective global action 
to tackle the virus and limit its economic effects can only be 
fostered through transparent communication, proactive co-
operation and an objective assessment of global interde-
pendence. The forecasts on the spread of the virus produced 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO), for example, are 
only as accurate and useful as the voluntarily provided data 
by countries around the world; the global search for an effec-
tive vaccine will only be successful if the experiments of Chi-
nese scientists can be studied by French doctors and repli-
cated by American researchers; the provision of international 
humanitarian aid is all the more important as countries which 
exported critical equipment yesterday find themselves in 
need of foreign imports of that same equipment today.  
On the other hand, the two main geopolitical actors refuse to 
play according to these rules. Trump’s ‘America First’ ap-
proach is now a synonym for the US’ unilateral behaviour in 
international relations. Whereas once upon a time the former 
hegemon launched a Marshall Plan to relieve Europe from 
the economic hardships of the war, now the US attempt to 
buy out a German pharmaceutical firm to acquire exclusive 
rights of production over the Covid-19 vaccine in develop-
ment. The US government has also proved unreliable in com-
municating the emergency, as demonstrated by President 
Trump’s early downplaying of the pandemic, or the various 
labelling of Covid-19 as the “Chinese virus”, “Wuhan virus”, 
“a killer with an Iranian accomplice”, and “a foreign virus 
seeded by European travellers” (Bennett 2020).  
China, on its side, has engaged in a massive operation of 
cover-up of data over the magnitude of the outbreak origi-
nating in Wuhan. By silencing whistle blowers and withdraw-
ing evidence from the WHO, China has shown the dark side 
of that authoritarian rule that the Chinese propaganda ma-
chine is trying to portray as an effective model of governance 
for its success in containing the spread of the virus through 
strict controls and limitations of fundamental rights (Walsh 
2020).  
The current crisis reinforces patterns that have been defining 
the global arena for some time now. On the one hand, the 
EU’s reliance on transatlantic relations is now more than ever 
questioned by a US administration that frames its European 
outlook in terms of leverage exerted through transactional 
exchanges rather than as the strategic alliance sought in Brus-
sels. On the other hand, China’s global ambitions are made 
assertively explicit by the public diplomacy efforts Beijing is 
producing through its propaganda machine and the provision 
of foreign aid. 
In this situation, the EU needs to find a strategic edge to resist 
external pressure and protect its standing and interests on 
the global scene. If the status of China as a strategic partner, 
a competitor and a systemic rival has been publicly acknowl-
edged by the Commission (European Commission 2019), 
Brussels has not yet addressed the issue of the increasing rift 
with Washington through a dedicated policy. However, the 
Commission has indirectly tackled the US’ decreasing reliabil-
ity through von der Leyen’s insistence on EU support to mul-
tilateral governance. The Commission indeed understands 
multilateralism both as a value and a guiding principle for its 
approach to the “geopolitics of mutual interests” (Rios 2020).  
By forming new partnerships with actors committed to find-
ing common solutions to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Com-
mission would make full use of the window of opportunity 
provided by the current crises to fill the void in global leader-
ship – created by US retreat – and democratic governance – 
due to the rise of China’s illiberal model. 
Policy recommendation 5: Countries such as South Korea, Tai-
wan and Japan have been relatively successful in addressing 
the pandemic, and should be treated as EU strategic partners 
in finding a common solution to the crisis. Their model of re-
sponse appears to strike a more sustainable balance between 
use of new technologies, limitations of civil rights and respect 
of individual privacy as compared to China’s. Furthermore, 
the Commission should seek – together with the member 
states – to foster a more pronounced engagement of interna-
tional organisations and intergovernmental fora in providing 
a common economic response to the crisis. A first significant 
forum to mobilise should be the G-20, whose current presi-
dency, Saudi Arabia, is both directly concerned by the virus 
and actively seeking to regain a place in multilateral govern-
ance after the Kashoggi murder. Moreover, the Commission’s 
efforts should target global institutions such as the UN, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Such insti-
tutions can provide economic stimulus to the EU economy 
and shoulder part of the vital investments in medical research 
and innovation. The Commission should also establish a dia-
logue with the UN Development Programme and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development to promote 
joint support to Africa’s recovery efforts so as to ensure the 
EU can live up to its commitment to the ‘sister continent’ ly-
ing at the core of the recent EU-Africa strategic partnership 
(European Commission 2020d).  
Additionally, the Commission should engage global civil soci-
ety bodies to make sure that the response to the current crisis 
is perceived as inclusive and legitimate. Spending part of the 
Commission’s political capital in advocating common solu-
tions with these actors may not seem like a priority in the cur-
rent times of emergency. However, the benefits of investing 
in the maintenance of a healthy and collaborative interna-
tional system will in the medium term serve the  Commis-
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governance that lies at the foundations of the EU’s action in 
the world and is built around the values that the EU defend. 
Conclusion  
The immediate decisions taken by the EU and its member 
states to tackle the sanitary, political and socioeconomic ef-
fects of the Covid-19 pandemic will probably shape the future 
of the Union for the years to come. The Commission has a 
role to play in the response to the crisis. A geopolitical ap-
proach to the pandemic implies a commitment to increasing 
cohesion and policy coherence among member states, who 
remain the ultimate rulers of the sort of the EU; a realistic 
assessment of EU’s operational strengths and weaknesses, 
with the objective of reinforcing its strategic autonomy; and 
an action in the world aimed at enhancing Europe’s landmark 
multilateral leadership. The Commission’s mission is not easy 
as its legitimacy is contested and its competence constrained. 
However, the prize for its success is a steady progress in the 
European integration project, as well as an increased global 
presence fostered by its stronger geopolitical credibility. 
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